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THE RULE AGAINST IMPEACHING ONE'S
OWN WITNESS: A RECONSIDERATION
RALPH C. THOMAS*
One of the general rules of which the law is so fond is that you
cannot impeach your own witness. This rule, subject to exceptions as are
all general rules, comes into play when the lawyer attempts to question
in any fashion the correctness of the testimony offered by a witness placed
by him on the stand, or his motive for giving it.
The obvious rationale underlying the rule is sponsorship of the wit-
ness by his proponent. This presupposes, it would seem, that all witnesses
become so as a result of deliberate choice by the party using them. There-
fore, if his choice has been bad he must suffer the consequences. Such
a concept is so obviously foreign to the actual situation that it seems
strange that the rule has survived to this day. That those who work with
witnesses really believe otherwise is indicated by the number of writings
on the strategy of preparing for trial. Such writings deal with fortifying
the witness with practice direct examinations and cross-examinations so
that he will not say the wrong thing on direct and will adhere to his
original story on cross-examination. They enlarge upon the frailties of
witnesses on which counsel can capitalize by clever cross-examination in
order to turn the tide in his favor. This material indicates that the witness,
any witness, on either side, is a frail vessel who should be carefully strength-
ened by his proponent and whose destruction by the right tactics can
be engineered by the opposite party.1 In the face of the well-publicized
malleability of witnesses a rule which fastens on a party the consequences
of relying on them smacks of gamesmanship.
Nonetheless, the rule persists, despite the prevalence of biased, lying,
or reluctant witnesses. It is the purpose of this article to trace the di-
mensions of the prohibition against impeachment and discuss the possible
*Professor of Law, Tulsa University; LL.B. 1950, Oklahoma University;
LL.M. 1964, New York University.
1. E.g., BuscH, LAW AND TAcrcs IN JuRY TRIALs § 188 (1950); KELNER,
PERSONAL INJURY, SUCCESSFUL LITIGATION TECHN1,UES chs. 5, 11 (1965); and 2
BELLI, MODERN TRIALS ch. XV (1954).
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IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS
responses of counsel to the challenge of the reluctant, stupid, or recalcitrant
witness.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
The origin of the rule is obscure and lost among the dim reaches
of the development of the trial as we know it. Whatever its genesis, it
seems to have developed in civil litigation by 1700 when "Holt, C. J.,
Would not suffer the plaintiff to discredit a witness of his own calling,
he swearing against him."3 It had appeared nineteen years earlier in
criminal trials when the accused was informed in one case that he could
not disparage his own witness nor seek self-contradiction from an unwilling
witness.4 In another case of the same year the accused was told, "whatso-
ever witnesses you call, you call them as witnesses to testify the truth for
you; if you ask them any questions you must take what they have said as
truth . . . . [LMet him answer you if he will but you must not afterward
go to disprove him." 5
By the opening of the next century logical reasons were being as-
signed for the prohibition. Phillips in his Treatise on tte Law of Evidence,
after stating that a party will not be permitted to produce general evidence
to discredit his own witness, quotes from Buller's Nisi Prius that this
privilege if granted would enable the party to destroy the witness if he
spoke against him and to make him a good witness if he spoke for him.
Phillips continues: "The meaning of this rule is, that a party cannot
prove his own witness to be of such a general bad character, as would
make him unworthy of credit. If he knew the infamy of his character,
he was practicing a fraud on the court in producing him as a witness." 6
The idea that it is only fair play that a party stand or fall by his
own witness is given clearer form a few years later in the American
case of Whitaker v. Salisbury, where the court said-
But when a party calls a witness whose general character for truth
is bad, he is attempting to obtain his cause by testimony not
worthy of credit. It is to some extent an imposition on the
court and jury. The law will not suppose, that a party will do
2. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.
Car. L. REV. 69 (1936).
3. Adams v. Arnold, Holt K.B. 298, 90 Eng. Rep. 1064 (1700).
4. Fitzharris' Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 223, 369, 373 (1681).
5. Coolidge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 636 (1681).
6. PHILLIPs, EVIDENCE 213 (1st Am. ed. 1816).
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any such thing; but will rather hold the party calling the witness
to have adopted and considered him as credible.7
It is a grim choice that confronts the lawyer. Knowing his witness
to be a liar, or at least biased, but assuming that he is telling the truth
on this occasion, he can leave him off the stand and thereby refrain from
"imposing" or "practicing a fraud" on the court. On the other hand,
he may take the risk of the witness disappointing him even though he can
do little to repair the damage.
The rule has always been that the witness can be contradicted by other
witnesses who testify differently. Phillips puts it thus: "But if a witness
unexpectedly give evidence against the party that called him, another
witness may be called to prove those facts otherwise . *.. !"I And a
modem decision clarifies the point by saying: "One who calls a witness
vouches for his credibility . . . .He does not vouch for his infallibility
and constitute him one incapable of being mistaken." D
II. LimiTs OF THE RULE
What then are the boundaries of the rule against impeachment of
one's own witness? Definition of the word "impeachment" would seem
necessarily to precede an answer. The word carries more than one connota-
tion. One is the establishing of the witness as, or as inclined to be, a liar.
Another describes the attempt to prove that he has lied on this occasion,
as evidenced by a prior inconsistent statement. A third is an attempt to
prove mistake, or something akin to it which does not establish depravity
but rather confusion or stupidity.
By the early decades of the nineteenth century the rule seems unques-
tioned that a general attack on character could not be made and a distinc-
tion was being drawn between such an attack and allowing proof of prior
self-contradiction.'0 The concept persists, taking its latest form in the
1965 revision of the Texas statutes, which in terse language provides for
impeachment of one's own witness, "except by offering evidence of the
witness' bad character."" It found earlier expression in a case where
attempts were made to show that the proponent's witness had been a
7. 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 534, 545 (1834).
8. PHILLIPs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 213.
9. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Love, 149 S.W.2d 1071, 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
10. Wright v. Beckett, 1 M. & Rob. 414, 174 Eng. Rep. 143 (1833).
11. TEx. CODE CalM. PRoc. art. 38.28 (1965).
[Vol. 31
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prostitute and afflicted with venereal diseases; the New York Court of
Appeals holding that if the only effect of an affirmative answer is to
discredit the witness the question is objectionable.12 The North Carolina
court refused to allow the state to impeach witnesses' general reputation
for truth or to impugn their credibility by general evidence tending to show
them unworthy of belief.13 And the Oklahoma court, in an early case,
put it this way: "A party who places a witness upon the stand thereby
vouches for his veracity, or at least vouches that the witness is not to
deeply steeped in moral turpitude as to be worthy of some credence.
Therefore such party shall not be permitted to impeach such witness by
showing his general bad character for truth."'14
A further distinction is drawn in some jurisdictions which confine
the impeaching effort to a demonstration that the witness is a liar, as
opposed to showng he is so deficient in moral fiber that it is likely that
he is one. New Jersey, although allowing impeachment of one's own
witness, provides that traits of his character other than honesty or veracity
shall be excluded.15
By the early decades of the nineteenth century the choice restricting
impeachment, for the most part, to proof of prior contradictory statements
had been made. In Wriglt v. Beckett's a witness who testified unsatis-
factorily for plaintiff was asked if he had not given a contrary statement
to the solicitor two days before. Lord Denman, who let the evidence in
over objection at nisi prius, later paid his respects to Buller's rule on
motion for new trial and said it was confined to proving general infamy
but did not extend to self-contradiction. He continued:
But how can this prevent me from showing that he states an un-
truth on a particular subject, by producing the contrary statement
previously made by him, which gave me just cause to expect
the repetition of it now. If his character is injured, it is not di-
rectly, but consequentially; but perhaps no injury may arise;
there may be a defect of memory; there may be means of per-
fect explanation.' 7
12. People v. Minsky, 227 N.Y. 94, 124 N.E. 126 (1919).
13. State v. Freeman, 213 N.C. 378, 196 S.E. 308 (1938). Although this case
involved prior contradictory testimony, the rule is clear.
14. Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 362, 102 Pac. 57, 58 (1909).
15. NJ. RuLEs OF EVIDENcE R. 22. This rule can be found in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-16 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
16. 1 M. & Rob. 414, 174 Eng. Rep. 143 (1833).
17. Wright v. Beckett, supra note 16, at 425, 174 Eng. Rep. at 146-47.
1966
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The persistence of this rationale is indicated by the Missouri case
of Detjen v. Moersckel Brewing Co.,'8 allowing interrogation on incon-
sistent statements for the purposes of refreshing the recollection of the
witness, of inducing him to correct his testimony, and of allowing counsel
to show why the witness was called.
The rule that inconsistent statements could be inquired into carries
a requirement, also of early origin, that it is the presence of surprise
that allows the impeachment. Thus, in Wright v. Beckett, Lord Denman,
in building the argument for admission of the impeaching testimony said:
Suppose that in some dispute happening in the street by a by-
stander declares his name to one of the contending parties, and
his readiness to prove his conduct blameless; that he attends the
solicitor, and gives in his deposition to the same effect, but,
when sworn in open Court, takes part with the adversary ....
Some one in Court happens to know him, and whispers to the
attorney, "He has deceived you in every way; he has given you
a false name; he is the adversary's brother and partner; moreover,
he has been for years notoriously infamous." Or suppose such a
trial for misdemeanor ... and that some stranger, after voluntar-
ily offering his testimony to a calumniated man, should unexpect-
edly side with his false accuser. If the rule against discrediting your
own witness must be strictly construed, these deceptions cannot
be exposed . . . . [I]f you are permitted, by reason of your late
discovery of these facts, to prove them for your own necessary
protection, this must be, because the rule cannot apply to a
case where such facts are brought to your knowledge after you
have placed him in the witness box. The rule therefore is limited
by that condition; and you shall be at liberty to discredit your
witness .... because you have been deceived and surprised.19
The requirement of surprise is the characteristic factor in most of
today's cases involving witness disappointment. It is the conditioning
element in the majority of attempts to repair the damage done by a
recalcitrant or untruthful witness. The concept of hostility plays an
important part as well, and both merit more detailed discussion.
III. THE ANATOMY OF SURPRISE
For the most part, "surprise" takes the same meaning in law that
it does in other contexts, although courts, as in a Missouri case,20 have
18. 157 Mo. App. 614, 138 S.W. 696 (1911).
19. Wright v. Beckett, supra note 16, at 425, 426, 174 Eng. Rep. at 147.
20. Crabtree v. Kum, 351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851 (1943).
[Vol. 31
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held that before impeachment by contradiction the court must find that
some statements or artifice entrapped or misled the party into calling
the witness. It is difficult to believe that the Missouri court was not
thinking in terms of conduct amounting to the less dignified, but more
expressive term, "double-cross."
Whether enunciated in terms of the double-cross or couched in less
condemnatory language, the cases indicate that counsel must justifiably
have expected an answer different from the one he got from his witness.
When this justifiable expectation is lacking there can be no impeach-
ment by confrontation with the prior inconsistent statement. In State v.
Nelson,21 one of the state's witnesses gave unfavorable testimony and the
prosecution was allowed to cross-examine her from her testimony at the
coroner's inquest. It was established that two days before the witness
was called in the trial she had furnished the prosecution an affidavit in
which she repudiated her testimony before the coroner. Holding that there
was no justifiable surprise, the court reversed for the damaging effect of
the inadmissible prior contradictory statements. In another case the wit-
ness had implicated the defendant in a statement to the prosecution
but had testified in the prosecution of one Steen so as to exculpate de-
fendant a few days before the trial in which impeachment was sought.
The county attorney when confronted with his adverse testimony was
prohibited from examining him on his statement. The court said that
the state had made no showing that since the Steen trial anything had
occurred leading to a belief that his testimony would differ from that prof-
fered in the case against Steen.m And, on re-trial, the recalcitrance of the
witness cannot be inquired into if it was manifested in the first trial.
23
Less clearly expectable disappointment is apparent in Sidlivan v. United
States24 where three convicts had signed a joint statement inculpating
Sullivan. They repudiated their statement, and impeachment by means
of the statement followed. It was held that there could be no claim of
surprise with respect to the last two witnesses because the three had
signed a joint statement indicating they were acting in concert, and the
first witness' repudiation was fair warning the others would follow suit.
Assuming the correctness of the court's premise it becomes apparent that
21. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940).
22. Sturgis v. State, supra note 14.
23. Woods v. State, 38 Ala. App. 582, 90 So. 2d 92 (1956).
24. 28 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1928).
1966
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the decisive factor is whether the double-cross coincides with the testimony.
If it precedes it by enough time to allow counsel to avoid asking and
receiving the disappointing answer, then surprise is not present. Also
illustrative of this formulation is People v. Underwood2r where, after
the trial was in progress, proceedings out of the jury's presence were
held and the witness indicated that he would not testify as he had
previously led his proponent to believe. Surprise was not found. Surprise
is lacking in even the ordinary sense when the prosecution does not
know that the witness has made a prior contradictory statement until
after he testified and left the stand. Recalling him for impeachment is
prejudicial error.26
One trial court gained approval for action which controlled the
element of surprise. Defense counsel having said that he intended to call
the defendant's two sons, the court informed him that the District At-
torney expected the sons to testify in a manner contrary to their state-
ments. He extended to defense counsel an opportunity to talk to the
boys in chambers and said that a failure to do so would preclude a find-
ing that surprise was claimed in good faith.27 What seems a completely
different attitude was displayed in McLain v. State,28 where the court
noted that the witness' statement was taken the day after his mother's
arrest and was reiterated before the grand jury. The court then said,
"and the prosecutor very wisely, under the circumstances, refrained from
talking to the witness again until he was placed on the stand. This is a
perfect case authorizing the plea of surprise."29 This rule is lenient to
the extent of according a privilege of "hear no evil, see no evil" conduct
to counsel.
Leniency of a lesser degree is accorded in an Oklahoma prosecution
involving automobile speed. Shown his statement before trial and asked
if it were true, the witness answered, "Yes, I don't want to mess with the
speed." On trial he repudiated his former statement about speed. The
court said that it was not unreasonable to expect a witness who had twice
testified under oath to repeat his testimony and his statement before trial
was not such as to "relieve the situation on the subject of the speed, of
25. 37 Cal. Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937 (1964).
26. Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 145 A.2d 428 (1958).
27. People v. Humphrey, 220 Cal. App.2d 451, 33 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1963).
28. 383 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
29. Id. at 414.
(Vol. 31
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the element of surprise."3 0 Expression of reluctance to "mess with the
speed" could mean either that he did not wish to change his former
testimony or that he did not wish to become involved on the question
of speed. A more exacting court would have required the prosecutor to
resolve the ambiguity before interrogation.
It has been held that even if the witness has given disparate accounts
before trial this does not rob the proponent of surprise if the last account
given by the witness is the one sought to be established by him. Thus,
if the witness first accused defendant to the prosecutor, then testified
on a preliminary hearing so as to exculpate him and followed this with
inculpatory testimony before the grand jury, the prosecution could reason-
ably assume her testimony at the trial would be the same as before the
grand jury. 1 And counsel can claim surprise more than once while the
same witness is testifying, the first disappointment not being held notice
that his witness is likely to repudiate another part of his former story.3 2
Surprise in the full sense is not demanded in one jurisdiction which
allows counsel who has ground for believing that the witness will testify con-
trary to a statement that he has given to call the witness under the belief
that when confronted by the prior statement he will abandon efforts to
deviate from it. a3 Confidence that the witness will adhere to the original
statement because of his respect for the oath or his fear of a prosecution
for perjury excuses the lack of surprise also.3 4 However, the assertion of
such a belief is not always suffibient. It was denied in one case when the
witness before trial had said that he would not identify defendant because
he would prefer to go to jail rather than have his wife and children in
jeopardy. The court ruled that not only was there no surprise because
the witness had told the prosecutor before trial that he would not abide
by his former statements but that it was unrealistic to expect him to
implicate defendant when his reluctance to do so was based on fears for
his wife and children0t 5
In contrast to the more restrictive application of the concept of surprise
is People v. Kidd,36 where the California court met the argument that the
30. Barry v. State, 369 P.2d 652, 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
31. People v. Williams, 22 Ill.2d 498, 177 N.E.2d 100 (1961).
32. Ryan v. Monson, 33 II. App.2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961).
33. Liebman v. Society of Our Lady of Mount St. Carmel, Inc., 151 Conn.
582, 200 A.2d 721 (1964).
34. Commonwealth v. Joseph, 182 Pa. Super. 617, 128 A.2d 121 (1956).
35. State v. Caccavale, 58 N.J. Super. 560, 157 A.2d 21 (1959).
36. 16 Cal. Rptr. 793, 366 P.2d 49 (1961).
1966
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defense had made no effort to inquire of the witness what his testimony
would be, had not talked to him, and was not, therefore, entitled to claim
surprise. The defense stated that they were relying on newspaper accounts
of what the witness, a coroner, had said after the coroner's inquest. The
court ruled that as the witness was a public official it would not appear
unreasonable to assume that his testomony would be the same as the
statement attributed to him in the press. California requires a showing of
surprise and it is improper for the court to take the word of the counsel
alone.8 7 But in People v. Kidd the court found that defendant showed the
basis for surprise.
Peurifoy v. State,38 expressly allows the unsupported statement of the
solicitor to establish surprise. The ninth circuit has held the same in
criminal cases, 9 allowing surprise to be shown by the statement of coun-
sel or otherwise and explicitly ruling that no hearing on surprise was
necessary. In an earlier ruling,40 the same circuit had held that the gov-
ernment was not required to contact the witness to ascertain whether
she would abide by her story because they were under a duty to call the
witness. Another federal court has allowed counsel to place his faith in
the sobering influence of court even though he was aware of contradictory
statements before trial.41
IV. ThE CONCEPT OF HOSTILITY
"Hostility" is an imprecise term in law, almost exclusively a term of
art. The ordinary usage of the word would seem to indicate that a hostile
witness is one who through association or inclination tends to be antag-
onistic to the interest of the proponent of his testimony. This is the mean-
ing it takes in some instances. Louisiana, which in its Code of Criminal
Procedure permits the impeachment of the witness who has surprised his
proponent or is hostile,42 has had hostility defined as not dependent upon
a belligerent or biased attitude in giving testimony, but capable of being
established by a showing that the witness' interest is on the side of the
accused to such an extent that he or she will not give a true account of
37. People v. Wilson, 156 Cal. App.2d 728, 320 P.2d 117 (1958).
38. 53 Ga. App. 515, 186 S.E. 461 (1935).
39. Bieber v. United States, 276 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1960).
40. Stevens v. United States, 256 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1958).
41. Journeyman Plasterers' Soc'y v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965).
42. LA. REv. STAT. § 15.486 (1950).
[Vol. 31
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the transaction. 43 In this case the court ruled that the witness' hostility
was evident from her previous illicit relationship with the defendant.
By reading between the lines, the same meaning of hostility may be
gleaned from some cases where it is not so clearly enunciated as in
State v. Willis. In a prosecution for the death of a police officer two brothers
named Bell were involved as well as three women, one of whom was
identified as living with one of the brothers, William Bell. One of the
two other women present at the altercation first gave a statement that
the defendant George Bell killed the officer and then testified differently
at the trial. The court allowed the prosecutor to claim surprise and to
cross-examine, and this was approved, the court saying that she was
plainly hostile to the state and had contradicted her former statement
and testimony.44 Unless hostility consisted entirely in change of position,
the inference arises that she was thought to be in sympathy with the
defendant, George, because she was identified with him if with either
of the two brothers.
In Commonwealtl v. Barte145 a house had been dynamited in labor
strife and two of those implicated had been convicted. Called in Bartell's
trial by the state they gave testimony which was characterized as reluc-
tant and hostile. No plea of surprise was made nor was one needed, the
court held, because the fact that they were hostile and adverse witnesses
was alone sufficient to allow cross-examination by the prosecution. There
was a conflict between their present and prior testimony.
In Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 46 plaintiff asked leave to ex-
amine a witness, Harris, under Federal Rule 43(b) 47 which allows a
party to call the managing agent of the adverse party and interrogate
him by leading questions and to impeach and contradict him. The court
noted that the first part of rule 43(b) allows leading an unwilling or
hostile witness and, finding that Harris was not a managing agent as
alleged, measured plaintiff's demands by whether Harris was a hostile
witness. In so doing, the court ruled that the witness must be considered
43. State v. Willis, 241 La. 796, 131 So.2d 792 (1961).
44. State v. Bell, 359 Mo. 785, 223 S.W.2d 469 (En Banc 1949).
45. 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166 (1958).
46. 314 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1963).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (b): "A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile
witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, di-
rector or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and
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hostile by reason of clear alignment of interest with the other party or
due to antagonism directed to the calling party.48
The clearest recognition of hostility where there could be no sur-
prise is in a Maine case49 in which the witness, after having testified
and made statements, indicated that she did not want to testify again
and would be out of town when the case was heard if she was informed
of its setting, Counsel, in calling her to the stand, referred to her as a
hostile witness and asserted that there are times when it is necessary to
call one who is hostile.
Hostility does not always mean that the court has found alignment
and sympathy with the other party. It usually means simply that there
is adverse testimony which is surprising to the proponent. Hostility was
asserted in Commonwealt. v. Turner50 when the witness Lofton, after a
bewildering succession of trials of Turner, refused to testify in Turner's
fifth trial in the same fashion that he had testified in Turner's third trial.
He had refused to testify in Turner's fourth trial. Reading of his testimony
from the third trial was allowed and reversal followed, the court ruling
that there was no basis for the claim of hostility as all the witness did
was testify that his recantation affidavit was correct. No mention is made
of Lofton's natural desire, which he had given as a reason in the fourth
trial, to withdraw from participation in the aftermath of a crime for which
he was now serving a life sentence.
Defining hostility in terms of surprising adverse testimony is com-
mon. Chamberlayne put it thus: "Certain jurisdictions hold that in the
event a witness believed to be friendly, is in fact hostile, and counsel is
thus surprised, he may show contradictory statements made at other
times, the purpose being to explain the attitude of the witness and offset
the effect of his testimony."5 1
Conrad52 comments that surprise testimony, in the discretion of the
trial court, characterizes the witness as hostile and opens the way to
impeachment. Conrad cautions: "There must be a showing that the party
offering a hostile witness has been taken by surprise at his testimony,
48. There was no finding of hostility and the discussion is therefore dictum,
but it was relied on by the Seventh Circuit, characterizing a witness as "aligned
with the interests of the Union," in Journeyman Plasterers' Soc'y v. NLRB, 341
F.2d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 1965).
49. In re Paradis' Will, 147 Me. 347, 87 A.2d 512 (1952).
50. 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957).
51. TakuL EVIDENCE, § 338 (2d ed. Tompkins, 1936).
52. MODERN TwIAL EvIDENCE, § 1135 (1956).
[Vol. 31
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that he is in fact hostile, and that the party is damaged by the witness'
unfavorable testimony." z3 A leading work on criminal evidence, after dis-
cussing the non-binding character of witnesses a party is compelled to
call and the ability of the party to contradict and impeach, continues:
Another exception occurs where the witness is treacherous and
proves unexpectedly hostile in his testimony upon the stand. If
he then gives a widely variant version of relevant facts, to the
surprise of the party in whose favor he was called, his extrajudicial
declarations may be proved, but solely for the purpose of impeach-
ment.5
4
Although it is common for witnesses to be characterized as hostile
because their testimony is adverse, one court, after reciting facts which
would show alignment against the proponent, described the contentious,
blustering attitude of the witness and said that his attitude and testimony
became so hostile that the proponent was allowed to cross-examine.5 5
Also, cross-examination was accorded by a Massachusetts judge who de-
clared the witness hostile because he found it necessary to admonish her
to sit in the proper attitude and to answer the questions audibly. 6
The Kansas court in Johnzson v. Hager57 characterized a witness as
hostile because her answers displayed familiarity with the events in ques-
tion but no memory of what defendant was alleged to have said on
these occasions. Hostility was found in this case because her answers
showed her to be an unwilling and hostile witness. She was the niece
of both parties and the court may have been indicating alignment when
it later said she was hostile to the cause of the defendant. And, in Iowa,
a witness was found to be hostile because he appeared evasive and antag-
onistic and the changes in his testimony surprised the prosecutor. No
stress was laid on his present employment with the defendent, which
would seem to presage disappointing testimony.
55
On balance it would seem that the marriage or near marriage of
the concept of hostility to that of surprise is confusing and misleading
and should be abandoned. The word "hostility" carries with it over-
tones of malice and wish to work a hurt. It does not correctly describe
53. Id. at 304.
54. 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 232 at 544 (5th ed. Herrick, 1956).
55. State v. Pietranton, 137 W. Va. 477, 72 S.E.2d 617 (1952).
56. Commonwealth v. Jones, 319 Mass. 228, 65 N.E.2d 422 (1946).
57. 148 Kan. 461, 83 P.2d 621 (1938).
58. State v. Billberg, 229 Iowa 1208, 296 N.W. 396 (1941).
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the attitude of all witnesses who change their former statements and
disappoint their proponents. For example, the writer once succeeded in
proving to a highway patrolman's satisfaction that his report was in
error and subpoenaed him, only to have him put on the stand by the
plaintiff in his case in chief. His description of the accident was ruinous
to the opponent, who was undoubtedly surprised, but in no sense was
the patrolman malicious or unfriendly to him.
V. TREATMENT OF SURPRISING WITNESSES
It is important to recognize for the purpose of discussion that counsel
may be surprised even when there is no double-cross and no hostility
which, in the nature of things, spawns the double-cross. The proponent is
nonetheless embarrassed if he receives an unexpected answer from a con-
fused or forgetful witness or from one who in good faith has changed his
testimony. In fact, counsel is presented with three principal possibilities
whenever he entrusts his case to a witness. There is the possibility that
the witness is antagonistic to the cause and the client and is biding his
time in order to strike a decisive blow against the side which calls him.
This is the truly hostile witness. There is the possibility that the witness
is confused and gives divergent testimony because of confusion. Here,
there is no hostility, and a clear field for rehabilitation exists. For instance,
one of the writer's witnesses, testifying in a retrial, was asked the dis-
tance between him and the writer's client when he first noticed him.
His expected answer based on the same question in two earlier trials was
eighty feet; his unexpected answer was one quarter mile. And, as indicated
in the change in the highway patrolman's testimony referred to above,
surprise may not come out of malice but out of conviction. After all,
the trooper and the other party had made the same mistake. The basic
question for trial counsel is his remedy when faced with any of these
possible situations.
The various jurisdictions show a bewildering diversity of treatment
for the witness who has disappointed his proponent when called. In some
the proponent is allowed to impeach, in others to neutralize, in others to
give the jury a choice between the former and the present statements. In
still others the former statements are usable only to establish surprise,
refresh the memory, and provide the witness with the opportunity of ad-
hering to the correct testimony. It cannot be said that there is any central
tieme, although, for the most part, the disappoined counsel is permitted to
attack the testimony by contradiction.
[Vol. 31
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Alabama holds that when a party introduces a witness he will not
be allowed to impeach him but, upon receiving unexpected answers, is
entitled to interrogate the witness about prior contradictory statements
to refresh his recollection, to show surprise, and to relieve himself of the
disadvantage he has been put to by such evidence. And, this may be done
although its incidental effect is impeachment of the witness.5 9 Incidental
impeachment is allowed also in Nebraska where upon surprise the wit-
ness may be asked about prior statements to establish counsel's surprise,
test the witness' recollection, refresh his memory, induce him to change
his testimony, procure an explanation of his apparent inconsistency, or
show the circumstances that induced the party to call him and that he
has been placed at a disadvantage by unexpected evidence.60
In Illinois the prior contradictory statement is allowed to show the
testimony is unexpected, to refresh the memory of the witness and
awaken his conscience, and to cause him to speak the truth if he is
lying.61 That incidental impeachment is also worked was conceded by the
court.
Absent the possibility of covert testifying by designing counsel who
asks about a fictitious statement, most would agree that opportunity should
exist for refreshing the memory of the witness, for allowing him to rectify
mistakes, and for extending to the perjurious witness a locus poenitentiae.
It is apparent that these formulations also include some degree of solic-
itude for the party (that is, his lawyer) who has put on a witness whose
testimony is the opposite of that which the party wants. That it is
opposed to the party's interest is almost always readily apparent to the
jury and, in any event, probably could be guessed by the look on counsel's
face. This seems to be the basis for the privilege extended counsel to dem-
onstrate that he not only can recognize testimony good for his case but
that he had reason to expect it from this witness. The element of face-
saving seems more important here than the more abstruse concept of
vouching for one's witnesses.
One of the difficulties inherent in letting the questions be asked of
the witness, even though no independent proof is allowed, is that the jury
may assume the truth of either the making of the prior contradictory
statement or of the content of the statement itself. This problem seems
59. Marcum v. State, 39 Ala. App. 616, 107 So.2d 899 (1958).
60. Svehla v. State, 168 Neb. 553, 96 N.W.2d 649 (1959).
61. Schoolfield v. Witkowski, 54 Ill. App.2d 111, 203 N.E.2d 460 (1964).
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to have been solved, in criminal cases at least, in Missouri, which allows
the interrogation of a recalcitrant state's witness for the purpose of refresh-
ing his memory but holds that this must be done out of the presence of
the jury.62 In a jurisdiction where the articulated reasons for asking the
witness about the prior statements do not include outright impeachment
or the jury's privilege of taking the statements as substantive proof, the
interrogation should be done out of the jury's presence.
In jurisdictions which allow counsel to do more than suggest to the
witness that he is mistaken or lying or attempt to refresh his memory,
a substantial problem remains. If the purpose of the question is to impeach,
or to show why counsel has called this witness, it is necessary that the
jury must know of the prior statements and therefore may, despite instruc-
tions, rely on them for the truth of the matter in issue. It would seem
that there should be at least some requirement of good faith on the part
of counsel in order to establish that he has grounds to believe that the
asserted prior statements were made.
Impeachment has been defined as "to call in question the veracity
of a witness by means of evidence adduced for that purpose."0 3 Maguire
wrote, "It really means something like 'derogate from credibility.'! Il
Whether it can mean more than attacking credibility and can also embrace
establishing the truth when a prior contradictory statement is used is
decided by most courts by resort to the hearsay rule. The great majority
of cases hold that the hearsay rule is violated when the prior statement
is allowed to be taken as expressive of the truth."5 Consequently, in most
jurisdictions it is unquestioned that a cautionary instruction is appro-
priate and needed to divert the jury from the choice.
Whether the jury follows the instruction is problematical. McCormick,
in attacking the distinction, notes that it is the possibility of truth of
the prior statement that damages the credibility of the witness. He depre-
cates the idea that the judge and jury may decide unreliability from the
fact of contradictory statements without considering the likelihood of
62. State v. Patton, 255 Mo. 245, 164 S.W. 223 (1914) suggests this technique
and State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47 (1936) converted it into strong
holding by reversing when the prosecution had gotten before the jury not only
the contradictory statements but also evidence that the unruly witnesses were both
under sentences of death and thus had nothing to fear as a result of their actions.
63. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
64. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 42 (1947).
65. Id. at 57.
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the truth of one or the other and says this would indicate, "a finical
neutrality alien to the atmosphere of jury trial."' 6
There is no certain way of testing to determine whether the jury
has decided the case by believing the matter asserted in the prior con-
tradictory statement. If the prima facie case or defense rests entirely on
the witness who has disappointed his proponent and the witness denies
the prior statement, the jury does not get the case. There has been a
failure of proof. However, if there are other witnesses to make out the
case, the outcome of the lawsuit may be based on the jury's acceptance
as truth of the matter contained in the statement. The proponent in
this instance has an advantage that the law seeks in most instances to
deny him. What appears to be an acceptance of this fact is seen in one
jurisdiction which, upon proof of prior contradictory statements, allows
the jury to decide which of the two versions represented truth.67
One device, that of "neutralizing," has the merit of decisive action,
at least. It obtains in New Jersey by court rule as well as decision. The
rules allows introduction of evidence impairing the credibility of a witness
including those called by the party, "except that the party calling a wit-
ness may not neutralize his testimony by a prior contradictory statement
unless the judge finds he was surprised." 68
The device has been explained as authorizing the cancellation or
erasure of the damaging testimony when necessary to prevent a miscar-
riage of justice. Its sole effect is to restore the status prevailing before
the witness testified, and his neutralized testimony is out of the case
as if he had never testified.69 The virtue of such a rule would seem to lie
in the removal of tainted testimony from the jury's' concern by an instruc-
tion which relieves them of a duty to weigh it. However, as the jury hears
the neutralizing testimony, the New Jersey court fears, as do courts in
other jurisdictions, that there will be improper use made of it as substantive
proof.70
VI. THE DILEMMA OF NEcEssARY BUT ADVERSE TEsTIMoNY
With minor exceptions the procedures outlined in this article to this
point have afforded relief to counsel who have been the victim of a double-
66. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 39 at 78 (1954).
67. Strickland v. State, 269 Ala. 573, 114 So.2d 407 (1959).
68. N.J. RULES oF EVIDENcE R. 20 (1966). See note 15 supra.
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cross of some magnitude. Such relief is meager and consists either in wit-
ness-prompting or in witness-destruction, and help is extended only to
counsel who is or who claims to be surprised. It seems apparent that these
measures do not go far enough and indeed miss the mark so long as they
are tied to surprise or entrapment.
The problem of the trial lawyer consists not only in surprise but in
the knowledge that information necessary to the trial rests in the hands
of witnesses who are hostile in the laymen's sense of the word. That is,
they are antagonistic to the cause of the person who must call them. Un-
less the advocate adopts the "hear no evil, see no evil" approach and does
not interrogate these witnesses before calling them, their pre-trial state-
ments are sure to disclose their antipathy and the futility of calling them
because he is bound by their testimony. This problem seems as important
as surprise, if not more so.
One procedure that has been utilized for this circumstance is to rule
that the party calling them is not bound by their testimony. In Johnson v.
Baltimore & O.R.R. 71 plaintiff's decedent was killed by a railroad police-
man. The only description of the encounter came from the policeman
who testified he killed in self-defense. Plaintiff called the policeman in
order to make out a prima facie case. The question was whether the
plaintiff, having called the policeman, was concluded by his story of self-
defense or whether the whole story should go to the jury. The court dis-
cussed the theory of witness sponsorship and said:
Nothing could make the rule look more foolish than its application
in a case like this . . . . What could be more human than that
Hall would make his story show the propriety of his own conduct
and the wrongfulness of that of his opponent in the fight. And what
would be sillier than to insist that the jury is compelled to believe
all that testimony which the witness offered in explanation of an
intentional killing on his part?"2
The action of the district court in leaving the fact questions to the jury
was approved.
This rule is consonant with trial realities. No reliance on surprise was
demanded. Indeed, if there had been any surprising element in the
trial it would have occurred if the policeman testified so as to negative
self-defense. Although the disregard of witness sponsorship seems a
71. 207 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954).
72. Id. at 635-36.
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healthy sign, it must be noted that the circumstances of this case are
not often duplicated. Plaintiff needed to call the policeman in order to
establish that the decedent was dead in the railroad yards at the hands
of the railroad. If she had not done this she would have lost because she
had not established a prima facie case. There are few instances where the
proponent's need is so stark.
The rules against impeachment of one's own witnesses ordinarily does
not apply to impeachment of the "compelled witness." The most common
of the compelled witnesses are those who have witnessed wills and whose
testimony is compelled in the sense that if they are within the jurisdiction
they must be called to prove the will. Where such a witness negates the
execution of the will by repudiating his apparent act of witnessing, it
has been held that he may be impeached. In Lott v. Lott73 the trial
court was confronted with an attesting witness who sought to convey
the impression that he did not know that the document he witnessed was
a will. The trial court's refusal to allow the proponent of the will, who
called the witness pursuant to statute, to ask questions which would
have shown that the witness in fact did know the nature of the instru-
men earned the condemnation of the Minnesota court. The court said that,
although the proponent of the will was bound to call the attesting witnesses,
their testimony did not thereby become binding on her. The Kansas
case of Amerine v. Amerine74 lays down the same rule in a situation where
the attesting witness denied all knowledge of the will or of his purported
signature on it. The court commented that any general rule about witness
sponsorship had no application to a compelled witness. 75
The courts have allowed such impeachment when the witness was
not a compelled witness because of the force of law but was one in fact
because the party calling him could not make out his case without him.
In Atwood v. Hayes76 the defendant needed to prove the contents of a
letter. His proof traced it into the hands of Froebe, whose deposition
was taken. In the deposition Froebe denied any recollection of such a
document. The defendant and his attorney were allowed to testify that
before taking Froebe's deposition he had told them he had had the letter
73. 174 Minn. 13, 218 N.W. 447 (1928).
74. 177 Kan. 481, 280 P.2d 601 (1955).
75. This part of the ruling may be dictum because the impeachment took the
form of contradiction by other witnesses and the court noted that when this is
done impeachment is incidental.
76. 139 Okla. 95, 281 Pac. 259 (1929).
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but it had been lost or destroyed. Argument that this was impeachment
of the defendant's own witness was to no avail. The Oklahoma court found
that, having traced it to Forebe's hands, plaintiff was under a duty to
put Froebe on the stand before he could offer secondary evidence of its
contents, because it would be presumed that Froebe still had it and could
produce it if called. The witness being compelled, impeachment was proper.
It may be seen that the witness was compelled only in the sense that
Froebe's testimony was necessary in order for defendant to make out a
defense. The trail of the letter had reached to Froebe. It had to be shown
that it could not be procured before secondary evidence would be allowed.
When Froebe testified that it was a false trail the unavailability of the
letter became fixed, but defendant needed to show that Froebe was not
believable when he said he had never had it; otherwise, the unavailability
of the letter would not be established.
What seems to be similar thinking is found in Fine v Moomjian,7
where plaintiff cross-examined defendant when defendant was testifying
in his own case in chief. Objection was raised that plaintiff, having al-
ready called defendant as a witness in her case, could not attack his
general credit. The court noted that the witness had been called by
plaintiff solely for the purpose of identifying certain signatures he had
made and, other than that, he had been called and examined solely as a
witness for the defendants.
Atwood v. Hayes, although decided upon different language, is strik-
ingly similar in effect to Johnson v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Although there
was no impeachment as such in the Johnson case, the end result was
that the party in each case was allowed to call a witness only a part
of whose testimony he wished to sponsor. In Johnson the court allowed
the jury to draw their own conclusions about the reliability of the testi-
mony and to find that there was a fight between decedent and the rail-
road policeman but that there had not been a situation calling for self-
defense. In Atwood the jury, aided by the impeaching testimony, was
allowed to draw the conclusion that the trail of the letter stopped with
Froebe since his testomony, which was to the effect he did not have it,
was not believable and, as it had been traced into his hands, his obduracy
made the letter unobtainable and secondary evidence of its contents ad-
missible.
77. 114 Conn. 244, 158 At. 241 (1932).
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A realistic view of trials indicates that in the sense of the Atwood and
Fine cases, the decisions to use many witnesses are compelled. It is only
where the party has a choice between two or more witnesses to an event
that he may have a choice. If there is only one witness he must rely
on the concept of compelled witnesses or he must concede the case. It is
apparent that in the Atwood case the court is allowing the impeaching
testimony in for its truth.
VII. SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEMMA
Recognition that regardless of surprise the calling party may be faced
with the necessity of putting on an antagonistic witness is accorded in
statutes which allow the calling of adverse parties, and those aligned in
some fashion with them, and treatment of them in a manner not governed
by the traditional rules of witness sponsorship. There are differing pro-
visions in the various jurisdictions. In Missouri any party to a civil action
may compel "any adverse party, or any person for whose immediate and
adverse benefit such action . . . is instituted . . . to testify . . . under
the rules applicable to the cross-examination of witnesses."78 Oklahoma,
in 1965, adopted a statute which enlarges on the theme by providing that
"any such adverse party, his agent, servant, or employee called as a
witness by the opposing party shall be deemed a hostile witness and may
be examined by the party calling him to the same extent as any opposition
witness. '79
These statutes do not base the right to treat a witness as hostile upon
surprise. For this reason these statutes are admirable advances. But neither
of these statutes go far enough. The newer Oklahoma statute included some
of those witnesses which common sense indicated would be as antagonistic
to the position of the calling party as would his opponent, but the older
Missouri statute confines its treatment to the adverse party or the person
for whose benefit the action is brought, the latter provision seeming to
include the real party in interest, those who sue by next friend, and
similar persons. However, neither recognizes that among those witnesses
that the trial lawyer can anticipate as hostile by nature are those related
by blood, by marriage, by like pursuits begetting sympathy, and by shared
antipathy to the calling side.
78. § 491.030, RSMo 1959.
79. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 383 (1965).
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A treatment which is broader in its scope is that of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. There it is provided:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading
questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director,
or managing agent of a public or private corporation . . . which is
an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and
contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party .... 80
It may be seen that the first clause is wide in scope and recognizes the
factor of unwillingness or hostility of the witness as a danger to the party
who must call him, placing no limitations by definition on those who may
be hostile. It recognizes hostility in fact. The latter clause is more narrow.
Oklahoma provides for impeachment of the "agent, servant and employee"
while the federal rule confines this treatment to "an officer, director, or
managing agent."
The idea that leading questions can be put to an unwilling or hostile
witness is not new. Phillips in 1816 wrote: "But if a witness should appear
to be in the interest of the opposite party, or unwilling to give evidence,
the court will in its discretion allow the examination in chief to assume
the form of a cross-examination." 81 One characteristic of cross-examination
is the use of leading questions. What is unclear is the further extent of
the permissible cross-examination. Ordinary cross-examination of the other
party's witness comprehends examination not only on the contents of the
direct testimony but also impeachment. That a distinction between the
treatment of a hostile witness and that of an adverse party or his agent
is intended is indicated by the court in Degelos v. Fidelity and Casutalty
Company of New York,82 which notes that the treatment of the adverse
party is of broader scope. Clearly, the treatment of the adverse party or
his agent can contain not only contradiction but impeachment.
Counsel faced with an unwilling or hostile witness he has called receives
assistance from the federal rule that has little to do with impeachment.
The nature of non-leading examination is such that an obdurate witness
can evade by pretended misunderstanding. The first clause gives counsel
the right to forestall the evasive tactics by pinpointing his examination.
This privilege is subject to the same vice that ordinary cross-examination
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b), supra note 47.
81. PrILLIps, EvmENcE 205 (1st Am. ed. 1816).
82. 313 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1963).
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for the purpose of impeachment carries, that is, that the examiner might
by his questions convey to the jury a picture of the facts not testified
to by anyone.
The first clause of the federal rule by its language extends no help
to the examiner who is aware of prior contradictory statements. Nor was
this the intention. The committee which framed the Federal Rules recom-
mended that the rule provide: "A party may show that any witness,
whether called by him or by an adverse party, has previously made,
under oath or otherwise, statements contradictory to his testimony .... ,83
However, the Supreme Court did not approve.
The distinction between a non-party recalcitrant witness and one who
is a party is artificial. This artificiality seems to have been recognized in
one case, when the court said:
[I]t has for some time been recognized that the truth might not
always spill forth from witnesses who are possessed of pertinent
information but who also have the interest of one of the opposing
parties close to his heart. Here the techniques of cross-examination
or impeachment may well be needed to jog the memory or bring
into clear focus the full import of testimony often obtainable from
no other source. Recognizing this, Rule 43(b) explicitly provides
in its first sentence that a party may interrogate any unwilling or
hostile witness by leading questions .... There is no specific pro-
vision concerning cross-examination of a witness who is not a party,
or an officer, director or managing agent of a party, though there
is persuasive precedent that the Court may in its discretion allow
a party to cross-examine and impeach his own witness if it appears
that the witness is hostile.84
And the artificiality of the distinction is more clearly brought out in the
case, which arose in the same circuit, where suit was brought against a
liability insurance company under the Louisiana direct action statute. The
assured was the son of the decedent and, as the court said, would be
torn between a desire to testify so as to secure money to his mother for
the father's death and a desire to exculpate himself from the disgrace of
negligently killing his father. In reversing the trial court's ruling that the
assured, not being joined, was not a party within the second clause of
rule 43(b) the court said:
83. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcCE 43.10, at 1347 (2d ed. 1964).
84. Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Just what Lyle's real interests might be was not a matter for the
District Judge, nor for us .... That was for the jury to appraise
in the light of a full and searching revelation. Our system of justice
rests necessarily on the historic assumption that civilized moral
people try their dead level best to tell the truth no matter how
much it helps or hurts. But being a mechanism for the resolution
of man's disputes, the instrument of cross examination is an
integral part of that system in order to penetrate all the conflicting
impulses or obstacles to lay bare the whole truth.85
It is just this ability of cross-examination to probe into the con-
flicting impulses and obstacles that makes the difference. Although leading
is a valuable right on cross-examination, it is not the only value of cross-
examination. Cross-examination is far more comprehensive and allows
interrogation into the motives, biases, and prejudices of the witness, while
leading means only that the answer sought may be suggested to the
witness in order to forestall the non-cooperative witness. Whatever the
original intention in the adoption of rule 43(b), and whatever its present
state with respect to the content of the leading questions allowed by the
first clause, the practice should be to allow cross-examination as well as
leading of all witnesses who are hostile whether because they are the
opposite party, his'agents, or merely those aligned with him because of
sympathy for him or antipathy toward the other party.
Unfortunately, there are few clear instances where cross-examination,
when permitted, has done more than confront the witness with his prior
contradictory statements. This is often provided for by statute, and one
case, in construing the prohibition against impeachment by evidence of
bad character, noted that the witness did not offer himself but was invol-
untarily called by his opponent. Under these circumstances the usual
questions of cross-examination, including conviction for crime, were pro-
hibited 88 Even where the statute did not specifically interdict impeach-
ment by showing bad character, the Wisconsin court held that impeach-
ment of the adverse witness must be limited to the matters testified to,
including prior inconsistent statements, unless and until the witness takes
the stand in his own behalf, at which time he can be asked questions
impeaching his character and credibility generally.87
California has held directly the opposite. In Lovinger v. Anglo Cali-
85. Degelos v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 313 F.2d 809, 813-14 (5th Cir. 1963).
86. Lomastro v. Hamilton, 76 R.I. 114, 68 A.2d 39 (1949).
87. Alexander v. Meyers, 261 Wis. 384, 52 N.W.2d 881 (1952).
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fornia National Bank of San Francisco"s the court, noting that the statute
provides that the party calling the adverse witness will not be bound
by his testimony, concluded that the party calling would be entitled to
the same cross-examination as would have been available if the party had
taken the stand in his own behalf, which would include the proof that
the witness had been convicted of a felony. California has hardened this
concept into statute. In its Evidence Code 9 provision is made for attacking
the credibility of one's own witness.90 But evidence of traits of character,
except those for honesty or veracity, are excluded. 91 Prior felony convic-
tions, on the other hand, may be admitted for the purpose of attacking
the credibility of the witness.92
It seems regrettable that the full right of cross-examination does not
accompany the calling of the adverse party or those in his camp. Limi-
tation to prior inconsistent statements presupposes that such statements
are the only means of successful shaking of the testimony. Although it is
possible that such statements are the principal sources, they are not
the only sources of success on cross-examination. Cross-examination may
disclose bias or prejudice or improper motives not enunciated before and,
therefore, not available as a prior inconsistent statement.
One answer to the problem of the recalcitrant witness is that the
party who wishes to call him refrain from doing so because of danger and
that the court call him. This is the so-called "court's witness." The courts
in the federal system may call a witness "neither party will risk calling" 98
and examine him, giving to both sides the right of cross-examination and
impeachment. This privilege may be availed of by the trial judge in
North Carolina94 and Oregon.95 In Illinois the court may call a witness
the state's attorney refuses to put on because of doubts of his credibility,
and either side may cross-examine.96 Questioning must be kept to the
issues and apparently cannot include matters of bias or prejudice. 91 The
88. 243 P.2d 561 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
89. Effective January 1, 1967.
90. CAL. Evm. CODE § 785 (1965).
91. CAL. Evm. CODE § 786 (1965).
92. CAL. Evm. CoDE § 788 (1965).
93. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Distrib. Co., 143 F.2d 826,
829 (5th Cir. 1944).
94. State v. Home, 171 N.C. 787, 88 S.E. 433 (1916).
95. State v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 169 Ore. 1, 124 P.2d 524 (1942).
96. Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494, 66 N.E. 32 (1902).
97. People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135, 95 N.E. 157 (1911).
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court should not call the witness unless his failure to do so would result
in a miscarriage of justice.9 8
The "court's witness" concept is one of the most engaging devices
offered to meet the problem. There is no vouching for a witness and the
witness rightly stands accountable for his utterances in the past. However,
in appraising the worth of such a practice it is well to consider some of
the phenomena of trial. The jury's impressions must be taken into con-
sideration. If such a designation is made for one or more witnesses, what
significance is this to have on the jury's mind? Are they not likely to
consider the witness to be of the court's own choosing and therefore unbiased
and entitled to extra weight? This is the fear of those who oppose the
calling of expert witnesses by the court.9 9 If this is a real fear one antidote
might be to tell the jury that the witness is called because the party
wishing to examine him does not trust him and does not wish to be bound
by his testimony. But it has been held that this cannot be done because
the fact that he has been called at the request of a party is not a challenge
to his truthfulness and veracity, nor is it proper for one party only to
appear distrustful. 00 Perhaps the problem might be solved by all of the
witnesses, with the exception of the parties, being designated court's
witnesses. There seems no reason why this should excite the interest of
the jury, particularly if they are told that this is simply a new way of
doing things.
If all the witnesses were summoned in this fashion and were examined
by the parties, in turn, by the techniques of cross-examination, including
leading questions, the transformation it would work would be more apparent
than real. The interdict against leading operates to cause skillful counsel
to so prepare their witnesses for trial that they will respond to a non-
leading question with the correct answer. To a well-prepared witness a
non-leading question is the cue to which he will respond. The suggestion
has simply been accomplished before trial. The outcome, in terms of
testimony, would be little different if leading were openly permitted.
A more difficult question is that dealing with confronting the witness
with prior inconsistent statements. Any formulation which allows counsel
to demonstrate surprise or his reason for summoning a witness carries with
it the distinct possibility that the jury is taking the prior inconsistency
98. People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935).
99. Lambert, Impartial Medical Testimony: A New Audit, in LEGAL ESSAYS
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ADVOcATE 434 (Klonsky ed. 1961).
100. People v. Robinson, 14 Ill.2d 325, 153 N.E.2d 65 (1958).
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for the truth it asserts. This is so even though the jury is warned to consider
it only for its allowable purposes. It would seem, therefore, that the juris-
dictions courting this danger as a matter of course would accomplish little
transformation if the jury were told that they could consider it for the
truth asserted, even though the witness does not admit the statement or
the truth of it. This, after all, is what is allowed in the case of parties,
their prior inconsistent statements being admissions. 10 1
A sensible reconciliation of the conflicting considerations which beset
this problem would seem to be that all witnesses should be called as court's
witnesses with the exception of the parties. They should be examined openly
as to their prior inconsistent statements, after counsel has demonstrated
the existence of such a statement. The jury should be allowed to use the
statements for the truth they assert. And, cross-examination for the purpose
of demonstrating bias, prejudice and the like should be allowed in order
for the jury to properly appraise the testimony of the witness.
VIII. CoNcLusIoN
It seems time that a vestige of the earliest trial procedure be excised
from modern practice. Particularly is this so for a rule which has been
under constant attack and has suffered intermittent erosion over the years.
Attempts at reform have been patchwork and timid, and none have accorded
with the psychology of witnesses and juries as understood by the bar. Once
sanction is given the jury to do what the bar knows they are doing anyway,
counsel can, by his forensic talents, properly treat the material the jury
is considering. It is submitted that such a change would not stultify jury
trial but would invigorate it. It would accord to juries the dignity of
decision now denied them. Most important, it would put sense in an area
overgrown with centuries of nonsense.
101. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 239 (1954).
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